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THE NORTH DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED 
CORPORATIONS ACT: A BRANDING INITIATIVE 
WITHOUT A (NORTH DAKOTA) BRAND 
JOSHUA P. FERSHEE∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When the North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act1 (“Act”) 
became law on July 2, 2007, the state of North Dakota officially entered (or 
tried to enter) the corporate governance market.  The Act put North Dakota 
in direct “competition” with Delaware, which is the corporate home to just 
under two-thirds of all Fortune 500 companies and was the state of incorpo-
ration for approximately “75% of all U.S. initial public offerings since 
January 2003.”2  Why North Dakota decided to enter this market is not 
entirely clear.  Part of the answer is that out-of-state proponents of this and 
similar laws thought (not inappropriately) that North Dakota might adopt it, 
thus providing a pulpit from which to promote their views of good cor-
porate governance.3  The other part is that at least some North Dakota 
supporters believe that the Act might attract new business to the state.4 
One thing is certain, it was not because North Dakota had significant 
prior experience with public corporations.  As of January 2008, only two 
publicly traded corporations were incorporated under North Dakota law, the 
 
∗Assistant Professor of Law, University of North Dakota School of Law.  Before his legal 
career, Professor Fershee was a public relations executive specializing in strategic planning, brand 
management, and crisis communications with two Los Angeles public relations agencies. 
1. N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 10-35 (2007). 
2. William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, Manufacturing Mystery: A Response To 
Professors Carney and Shepherd’s “The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing Success,” 2009 
U. ILL. L. REV. 95, 99 (citing E-mail from Richard J. Geisenberg, Assistant Sec’y of State, State 
of Del., (Oct. 2007); see also Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory: Legal Innovation and 
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 212 (2006) (stating that 
about 50% “of the largest corporations are incorporated in Delaware, the majority of firms going 
public for the first time are incorporated in Delaware, and the overwhelming majority of firms that 
change their domicile mid-stream reincorporate in Delaware”). 
3. See Hearing on H B. 1340 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 60th N.D. Legis. Sess., at 
12 (Jan. 24, 2007) (testimony of William H. Clark, Jr., President ND Governance Council), 
available at http://ndcgc.org/Reference/CommitteeMinutes/2007.01.24%20House%20Judiciary% 
20Committee%20Minutes.PDF [hereinafter Clark Testimony] (explaining that the law was first 
proposed and considered in Vermont and that several lessons were learned from the first attempt). 
4. Id. at 1 (testimony of Rep. Rick Berg) (“This bill has tremendous potential [to] encourage 
businesses to come to [North Dakota and] it has a real opportunity to not only attract these busi-
nesses, but also tell the rest of the country . . . that [North Dakota] believes in a business model 
that encourages shareholder involvement and support.”). 
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same number that existed before the optional Act passed.5  Despite a solid 
and stable business climate in North Dakota, this is not likely to change 
much in the foreseeable future. 
To be clear, this Article is not arguing that the Act was bad (or good) 
for North Dakota or that any significant harm (or benefit) has followed 
directly in its wake.  There is already significant debate about the value of 
increased shareholder (and institutional investor) rights, both in legal 
scholarship6 and in the testimony related to passage of the Act.7  This 
Article is specifically not entering the debate about whether increased 
shareholder rights, generally, or the Act, specifically, will help or harm 
corporations by virtue of the laws themselves.  That is for another day or for 
other commentators.  This Article argues that there were, and are, legisla-
tive and public relations options that are necessary if North Dakota is to 
reap any lasting benefit from passage of the Act.  What is clear is that North 
Dakota has gained some national publicity for taking innovative and unique 
(if largely ineffective) measures in an area traditionally dominated by 
Delaware.8 
 
5. See Hearing on H B. 1340 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 60th N.D. Legis. Sess., at 1 
(Mar. 5, 2007) (testimony of Dave MacIver), available at http://ndcgc.org/Reference/Hearings/ 
Tab15.pdf [hereinafter MacIver Testimony].  The two corporations are Integrity Mutual Funds and 
Dakota Growers Pasta.  Id. 
6. Compare Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 
1149-50 (1997) (stating that strong protection for minority shareholders leads to better market and 
better corporate governance), and Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for 
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 783 (2001) (arguing that strong public markets 
requires laws to ensure that minority shareholders have: “(1) good information about the value of 
a company’s business and (2) confidence that the company’s insiders (its managers and con-
trolling shareholders) won’t cheat investors out of most or all of the value of their investment”), 
with Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Rights, 53 UCLA L. REV. 
601, 626 (2006) (“[D]irectors cannot be held accountable without undermining their discretionary 
authority.  Establishing the proper mix of discretion and accountability thus emerges as the central 
corporate governance question. . . .  Active investor involvement in corporate decisionmaking 
seems likely to disrupt the very mechanism that makes the public corporation practicable . . . .”), 
and Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting 
Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 1201-02 
(2005) (noting the appeal of “director primacy as the appropriate governance model”) (“The 
capability of shareholders (as a disparate group) to manage relatively large corporations is 
hindered by collective action problems tied to disparate preferences, different persuasive abilities, 
different time horizons, as well as differing capacities to digest pertinent financial, microeconomic 
and macroeconomic information (even when widely available).”).  See also Roberta Romano, 
Public Pension Fund Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 795, 
852 (1993) (arguing that “political pressure[s] to support local firms and engage in other forms of 
social investing places important limits on the effectiveness of public fund activism in corporate 
governance”). 
7. See Clark Testimony, supra note 3, at 2-3; MacIver Testimony, supra note 5, at 1-6. 
8. See, e.g., Cari Tuna, Theory and Practice: Shareholders Ponder North Dakota Law, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2008, at B6 (“A new front in the battle over corporate governance is 
emerging in an unlikely place: North Dakota.”). 
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This Article first considers how the Act came into existence, examines 
the key provisions of the Act, and compares those provisions to other 
prominent corporate governance laws.  Part III of the Article considers the 
market for corporate laws that the Act was designed to enter.  Part III also 
discusses whether such a market actually exists and explains why, even if 
there is such a market, the Act (at least on its own) is not likely to be an 
appealing option for public corporations.  Part IV then explains that North 
Dakota already had plenty to offer corporations and shareholders, and that 
measures other than the Act were and are far more likely to entice new 
organizations (or reorganizing companies) to the State.  Finally, the Article 
concludes that the Act did little to help or harm North Dakota business and 
offers some suggestions for what the state could do to capitalize on the 
publicity and awareness already gained from passage of the Act. 
II. THE ACT:  HOW IT HAPPENED, WHO IT SEEKS TO SERVE, 
AND WHAT IT DOES 
A. FIRST THINGS FIRST:  UPDATING THE STATE CONSTITUTION 
The Act and other changes to corporate laws became possible in June 
2006,9 when voters approved several amendments to Article XII (Corpo-
rations Other than Municipal) of the North Dakota Constitution.10  Before 
the amendments, Article XII included language that predated November 2, 
1889,11 when North Dakota became the country’s thirty-ninth state.12 
There can be little doubt that changes were warranted because there 
“were outdated or unnecessary provisions” of the pre-amendment Article 
XII.13  For example, the amendments repealed railway-related provisions of 
the constitution,14 which are now under federal jurisdiction, such as railway 
interconnections and railroad mergers.15 
 
9. See Hearing on H B. 1340 Before the House Judiciary Comm., 60th N.D. Legis. Sess., at 1 
(Jan. 24, 2007) [hereinafter Jaeger Testimony](further testimony of Sec. of State Al Jaeger), 
available at http://ndcgc.org/Reference/Hearings/Tab1.pdf  (“We knew there were North Dakota 
companies incorporating in other states because of provisions in the state’s constitution unfavor-
able to public corporations.”); Dale Wetzel, Constitutional Changes Approved, BISMARCK TRIB., 
June 14, 2006, available at http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/2006/06/14/news/state/ 
116304.txt. 
10. 2007 N.D. Laws 2004-05 (amending sections 1, 2, and 6, and repealing sections 3, 4, 7, 
8, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 17 of article XII of the North Dakota Constitution). 
11. Wetzel, supra note 9. 
12. MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S GEOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 1229 (3d ed. 1998). 
13. 2007 N.D. Laws 2004. 
14. N.D. CONST. art. XVII §§ 12, 13 (repealed 2007). 
15. See 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (2005); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-94, 
FREIGHT RAILROADS: INDUSTRY HEALTH HAS IMPROVED, BUT CONCERNS ABOUT COMPETITION 
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Perhaps the most significant modification was the change that 
permitted corporations to choose straight voting or other shareholder voting 
options.16  Prior to the amendment, North Dakota corporations were 
required to use cumulative voting.17  Cumulative voting has long been 
thought to protect minority voters,18 but is not especially popular with 
corporate managers.19 
In traditional (or straight) voting, each corporate shareholder is granted 
one vote per share per open board seat.20  Cumulative voting, on the other 
hand, helps provide proportional board representation.21  In cumulative 
voting, each shareholder is permitted one vote per share multiplied by the 
number of open board seats.22  For example, if a corporation has five open 
board seats, a shareholder with 100 shares would have 500 votes to cast for 
any of the candidates, as desired.  Thus, in cumulative voting, the share-
holder could provide 500 votes for any single candidate, or split the votes as 
they wish.  In traditional voting, the same shareholder could cast only 100 
votes for each open seat.23 
Cumulative voting gained significant traction between 1900 and 1945, 
when as many as twenty-two states mandated that corporations use cumula-
tive voting.24  However, today, the appeal of cumulative voting (at least as 
far as corporate governance legislation is concerned) has passed.25  By the 
1980s, nearly all states had reverted back to permissive voting schemes 
(allowing, but not requiring, cumulative voting).26  Perhaps underscoring 
 
AND CAPACITY SHOULD BE ADDRESSED 38 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new. 
items/d0794.pdf.  See generally Beau B. Bump, Held Captive: How Increased Regulation Arrests 
Railroads’ Ability to Serve the Nation, 5 DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 731 (2007) (providing a 
history of U.S. railroad regulation). 
16. N.D. CONST. art. XVII § 6 (amended 2007) (providing for cumulative voting as the 
default rule, but permitting the articles of incorporation to dictate the voting process for election 
directors). Delaware’s default rule is for straight voting, but permits cumulative voting if specified 
in the certificate of incorporation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 214 (2001 & Supp. 2008). 
17. N.D. CONST. art. XVII § 6 (1998). 
18. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 236-38 (2d ed. 2009). 
19. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative 
Voting, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 124, 155 (1994) (“Management’s willingness to change corporate 
domicile to avoid cumulative voting had a significant impact on the decision by several states to 
shift to permissive regimes.”). 
20. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 237. 
21. See id. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. (providing a more detailed and expansive explanation of cumulative voting, 
including a formula to determine the number of directors a given shareholder may elect if 
cumulative voting is used (using an example from MICHAEL P. DOOLEY, FUNDAMENTALS OF 
CORPORATION LAW 376 (1995))). 
24. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 145.  
25. See id.  
26. Id. 
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the motivation behind (and support for) the constitutional changes,27 one 
legal scholar noted in 1994, “No important corporate law jurisdiction [has] 
maintained mandatory cumulative voting.”28 
B. ACT TWO:  THE ORIGINS AND PASSAGE OF THE ACT 
Approximately six months after voters approved the constitutional 
changes, House Bill 1340, which was to become the Act, “[w]as read the 
first time and referred to the Industry, Business and Labor Committee.”29  
Continuing the theme of modernizing North Dakota’s corporate laws, 
Secretary of State Al Jaeger, in support of House Bill 1340, stated, “For 117 
years, the most anti-business corporation clause in the nation was in North 
Dakota’s constitution.  Now, North Dakota has an opportunity to provide 
business corporations with an option.”30 
To provide corporations with this option, a group called the North 
Dakota Corporate Governance Council (“Council”) was formed as “a 
nonprofit corporation organized to support enactment of the North Dakota 
Publicly Traded Corporations Act and to advance the discussion of share-
holder rights in publicly traded corporations.”31  The Council’s initial board 
of directors was William H. Clark, Jr., William Sorensen, and Steven 
Herman.32  Mr. Clark is a corporate attorney from the Philadelphia-based 
law firm Drinker, Biddle & Reath LLP, and Mr. Sorenson and Mr. Herman 
are business leaders from Bismarck, North Dakota.33 
The Act was principally drafted by Mr. Clark and was billed as a 
“fundamentally pro-business initiative” designed with the “ultimate goal” 
of improving “the performance of publicly traded companies by providing a 
new model of corporate governance.”34  In support of the Act, proponents 
argued that despite evidence that increased shareholder rights improved 
business performance, “state corporation laws have not yet moved in the 
 
27. See, e.g., Dave MacIver, Editorial, Measure No. 2 Needs a Yes Vote, BISMARCK TRIB., 
May 21, 2006, available at  http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/2006/05/21/news/opinion/ 
letters/doc446f72b0da947838857047.txt (“Measure No. 2 changes provisions that are no longer 
applicable or are covered by more recent federal laws and brings North Dakota incorporation laws 
into the 21st century. . . .  [C]orporation[s] should be allowed the choice of whether to provide for 
cumulative voting or regular or statutory voting of stocks.”). 
28. See Gordon, supra note 19, at 146. 
29. 60th Leg. Assem., House Journal 99 (N.D. 2007). 
30. Jaeger Testimony, supra note 9, at 1. 
31. About Us, North Dakota Governance Council, http://www.ndcgc.org/index_files/ 
Page390.htm. (last visited March 3, 2009). 
32. Id. 
33. See id. 
34. Clark Testimony, supra note 3, at 1. 
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direction of providing those greater rights.  Instead, it has been left to 
shareholders to seek greater rights on a company-by-company basis.”35 
Assuming this assertion is true, it is still a curious argument with re-
gard to the Act, because the testimony in support of the bill indicates that 
the Act is “purely optional.”36  That is, only corporations electing to incor-
porate under the law would be bound by its provisions.37  Any company 
that seeks to reincorporate under the Act would need shareholder interest 
and support that has been (at least to date) lacking, followed by subsequent 
support of the Board of Directors.38  Thus, it is hard to imagine more than 
one or two companies, if any, relocating to North Dakota in search of 
benefits that were already available under other state laws.39 
Recently, there has been something of a push to make the process of 
initiating a reincorporation easier by vesting the power solely in share-
holders’ hands.  Investor Carl Icahn, a leading shareholder advocate (for 
obvious reasons),40 recently argued that there should be “a federal law that 
allows shareholders to vote by simple majority to move their company’s 
incorporation to another state.”41  After all, he argues, “[b]ecause share-
holders own companies, they should have the right to move a company to a 
state that gives shareholders more protections.”42  Without a federal law, 
however, the odds of more than a nominal number of public companies 
relocating to North Dakota remain remote. 
Furthermore, as a completely optional set of governance rules, the law 
does not send much of a message about North Dakota’s commitment to this 
new shareholder governance scheme.43  Current North Dakota corporations 
 
35. Id. at 2. 
36. Id. 
37. Id.; see also N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(6), 10-35-03 (Supp. 2007).  
38. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 141, 242(b) (2001 & Supp. 2008).  This is true of most 
states, but is especially accurate, assuming Delaware law applies, which is appropriate given its 
prominence among publicly held corporations. 
39. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 679, 684-85 (2002) (“[S]tates other than Delaware stand to derive only small 
benefits from attracting incorporations, and take at most half-hearted steps to that end.”). 
40. See The 400 Richest Americans, FORBES, Sept. 17, 2008, available at http:// 
www.forbes.com/lists/2008/54/400lists08_carl-icahn_L1XF.html (“Another year, another slew of 
proxy battles for The Forbes 400’s richest ‘shareholder activist.’”).  In addition to his role as a 
“shareholder activist,” Carl Icahn is twentieth among America’s wealthiest people.  Id. 
41. Carl C. Icahn, Capitalism Should Return to Its Roots, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at A11 
(“That power is currently vested with boards and management.”). 
42. Id. (“[C]ertain states, like North Dakota, offer many more rights and protections to 
shareholders”). 
43. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 236-38 and accompanying text.  In fact, North 
Dakota laws were sending mixed messages about the importance of protecting shareholder rights.  
As noted above, in June 2006, the North Dakota Constitution was changed to eliminate mandatory 
cumulative voting, which is often viewed as a significant minority shareholder protection 
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(publicly held or not) are not only not required to adopt the Act as their 
corporate governance law, it is almost impossible for them to do so.44  This 
design is largely because of concerns of some North Dakota business 
leaders, who opposed the bill.45  In fact, the initial reaction of Mark 
Anderson, CEO of Integrity Mutual Funds, which is one of North Dakota’s 
public traded corporations, “was one of disbelief.”46  This local opposition 
also gives insight to how the law is likely to be viewed by many other 
business leaders around the country. 
There are those who would argue that the optional nature of the Act 
may be regarded as “trivial” because, “appearances notwithstanding, state 
corporate law . . . does not prevent companies—managers and investors 
together—from establishing any set of governance rules they want.”47  As 
the argument goes, after years of “erosion through competition for cor-
porate charters, what is left of state corporate law is an empty shell that has 
form but no content.”48 
Although one might argue that the Act seeks to return this missing 
“content” to corporate laws, the fact remains that it is a tough road to get 
companies actually to adopt the law.  “Either the reforms will get watered 
down to a thin gruel in the legislative process, or they won’t get adopted.”49  
In addition, real reform, at least under the current federal law regime,50 
would require the unlikely event of all fifty states adopting the proposed 
reforms to occur.51  Thus, the Act’s proposals are unlikely to attract many 
corporate charters, if any, even if the law were made mandatory for public 
companies. 
 
provision.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, North Dakota law provided the new, optional Act to protect 
shareholder rights for publicly trade corporations.  See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(6) & 10-
35-03. 
44. Clark Testimony, supra note 3, at 4 (explaining that current North Dakota corporations 
could only opt in to the act with “great difficulty” because “[t]hey are not  intended to be able” to 
do so). 
45. MacIver Testimony, supra note 5, at 1. 
46. Id. 
47. Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial? A Political and Economic Analysis, 84 NW. 
U. L. REV. 542, 544 (1990). 
48. Id. 
49. Id. at 580. 
50. Larry E. Ribstein, The Important Role of Non-Organization Law, WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
751, 753 (2005) (arguing that corporate laws are trivial because firms are free to choose their 
“applicable internal governance law”). 
51. Black, supra note 47, at 580 (“Without the support of corporate managers, this is an 
impossible task.”).  This does nothing for North Dakota business, but would promote the 
shareholder rights initiatives of the Act’s initial proponents. 
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C. ACTING OUT:  THE MAIN PROVISIONS & POTENTIAL PITFALLS OF 
THE ACT 
So what is this “content” the Act seeks to put back into corporate laws?  
The key provisions of the Act, as highlighted by its proponents52 include (1) 
majority voting in director elections53; (2) advisory shareholder votes on 
compensation reports54; (3) shareholder access to proxies, allowing 5% 
shareholders who have held their shares for more than two years to include 
board nominees55; (4) limitations on supermajority vote provisions56; and 
(5) limitations on antitakeover provisions.57 
While these provisions are not the norm in most state corporate gover-
nance laws, virtually all are also currently available to most corporations 
and shareholders, if so desired.58  The advantage of reincorporating under 
the Act is that the changes would take place immediately and in toto, rather 
than “on a piecemeal basis.”59  As such, were a corporation (and a sufficient 
number of its shareholders) to desire the rules set forth in the Act, reincor-
porating in North Dakota would provide a relatively easy way to obtain the 
benefit of the provisions available under the Act.  However, because 
reincorporation in any state would require the filing of new articles of 
incorporation,60 the only real savings gained by reincorporation in North 
Dakota under the Act would be the time saved incorporating the provisions 
of the Act directly into the articles of incorporation.  If, in all instances, 
reincorporation is required to gain the benefit of the Act’s provisions, the 
option to have the desired provisions has always existed, with roughly the 
same actions required of the company. 
In addition, any economy gained by using the Act comes with a 
concomitant economy in eliminating the shareholder protections offered by 
the Act.  A corporation governed by the Act can opt out of the law merely 
by changing the articles of incorporation to indicate that the company is no 
 
52. Clark Testimony, supra note 3, at 3-5. 
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-09 (2007).  However, this provision only applies if the articles 
of incorporation do not provide for cumulative voting. Id. § 10-35-09(2).  This is necessary 
because the default provision for corporate voting under the North Dakota Constitution is 
cumulative voting.  N.D. CONST. art. XVII § 6. 
54. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-12(5). 
55. Id. § 10-35-08. 
56. Id. § 10-35-11. 
57. Id. § 10-35-26. 
58. Clark Testimony, supra note 3, at 4 (“Everyone of these provisions, as a rule, could be 
put into a company’s organic documents today[, but] certain issues [would be difficult] depending 
on the particular state in which a company is incorporated.”). 
59. Id. 
60. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-11.  A North Dakota corporation may, but is not required to, 
have bylaws.  Id. § 10-19.1-31. 
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longer governed by the Act.61  Thus, although it may be harder to add the 
entirety of the provisions provided by the Act to an existing corporation, 
once added, it would also then necessarily be harder to remove all such 
provisions under traditional state corporate laws. 
All of this is not to say that the Act has been completely ignored; 
rather, the law is simply not likely to bring many new businesses to North 
Dakota.  Instead, the law is being used to pressure out-of-state companies to 
modify their practices or perhaps motivate other states to provide some 
more shareholder friendly provisions in their state corporate governance 
laws.62  In 2008, at least six companies issued non-binding proposals63 
seeking to have the respective corporations reincorporate in North Dakota.64  
There is little expectation of success, because even if the proposals were 
adopted by the shareholders, the boards of directors are unlikely to act on 
the recommendation. 
There is, of course, one exception.  Where there is a controlling share-
holder, such as one with more than 50% of the company, who wants the 
board to approve a reincorporation, the board is likely to follow the wishes 
of the controlling shareholder.  As an example, American Railcar 
Industries, Inc., a Delaware corporation, recently indicated that the board of 
directors would ask the shareholders “[t]o authorize and approve a change 
of the Company’s domicile from Delaware to North Dakota effected by [a] 
merger of the Company.”65   
 
61. Id. § 10-35-03(1). 
62. See Tuna, supra note 8, at B6; Letter to Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporate 
Finance From Qwest Communications (Dec. 31, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/ 
corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2008/cheveddensteinerk123108-14a8-incoming.pdf [hereinafter Qwest 
Letter]; Letter to Office of Chief Counsel Division of Corporate Finance from AIG (Jan. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2009/steinerche 
veddenaig011409-14a8-incoming.pdf [hereinafter AIG Letter]. 
63. See, e.g., Letter from Kenneth Steiner to Irwin D. Simon, Chairman of the Board, Hain 
Celestial Group, Inc. (June 28, 2008) (on file with author), available at http://www.sec.gov/ 
divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2008/kennethsteiner100108-14a8.pdf.  The proposals were 
phrased as shareholder “requests” of the Board of Directors.  For example, the Hain resolution 
proposed “[t]hat the stockholders of The Hain Celestial Group, Inc. (‘Company’) hereby request 
that the board of directors initiate the appropriate process to change the Company’s jurisdiction of 
incorporation from Delaware to North Dakota and to elect that the Company be subject to the 
North Dakota Publicly Traded Corporations Act.”  Id.  at 14.  The proposals are presented as non-
binding requests because Delaware law does not permit shareholders (unless authorized in the 
certificate of incorporation) to require board action (such as reincorporating in another state) 
through such shareholder proposals. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (2001 & Supp. 2008); see 
also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 267 (explaining that many state laws do not grant 
shareholders the power to initiate proposals, but that the SEC believes “a shareholder proposal is 
proper if phrased as a request or recommendation to the board”). 
64. Tuna, supra note 8, at B6. 
65. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 2 (May 6, 2009). 
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This move is possible because one of the Act’s leading proponents, 
Carl Icahn, owns more than 50% of American Railcar’s stock and is 
chairman of the board of directors, giving him significant influence over the 
corporation.66  As such, this public company is not like most other public 
corporations with diverse ownership.67  American Railcar would be the first 
corporation formed under the Act; however, because of Ichan’s significant 
ownership stake, this move is not likely an indicator that many companies 
will follow suit. 
Ironically, if the reincorporation does occur, the shareholders would 
not reap many of the benefits accorded under the Act.  American Railcar’s 
disclosures about the reincorporation proposal explain that “even if the 
Reincorporation is effected, Company shareholders may not immediately be 
able to avail themselves of all of the benefits otherwise available to them 
under the North Dakota Corporate Law.”68  This is because Icahn holds 
more than 50% of the voting power and can effectively dictate the outcome 
of any shareholder vote.  Of course, if Icahn were to “cease to control more 
than 50% of the voting power of the Company’s common stock, the 
Company’s shareholders would be able to avail themselves of the full 
panoply of shareholder rights provided by the” Act.69 
Barring the circumstances just explained, because of its permissive, or 
opt-in, nature, the Act should not have had any direct or significant impact 
on business decisions as to whether businesses would locate in North 
Dakota.  The idea was to create a “brand” of corporate governance that 
sends the message that a North Dakota publicly traded corporation is a cor-
poration that values shareholder input.70  However, that is not the “brand 
image” that seems to be emerging. 
As just discussed, the Act is shaping up to be a leverage point used by 
shareholders to urge some modifications to their current corporate gover-
nance procedures.  Over time, there could be a negative impact (i.e, nega-
tive brand image) if the Act is the only forward-looking or unique business-
related law passed in the state in the near future.  If no other innovative 
 
66. Id. at 43. 
67. WILLIAM A. KLEIN, ET AL., BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS 533 (6th ed. 2006) (explaining that 
shareholders in most public corporations, even institutional investors and individuals with “shares 
worth tens of thousands of dollars,” rarely have enough shares to impact the outcome of issues put 
to a vote at annual meetings). 
68. Am. Railcar Indus., Inc., supra note 65, at 43. 
69. Id. 
70. See Clark Testimony, supra note 3, at 2 (“One of the things we would like to do is 
actually create a brand.  One of the goals of this statute, is [to] have everyone immediately 
recognize when they are told that a company is a ND corporation [it] will immediately brand that 
company as a company that elected to take advantage of the full plan.”). 
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laws are passed in the near future—thus branding North Dakota as the 
“State With the Small Population, But Big Ideas”—the state runs the risk of 
becoming the corporate equivalent of sending a child to his or her room.  
That is, shareholders are essentially telling managers, “If you can’t get your 
act together, we’ll send you to North Dakota.”  So, naturally, managers are 
likely to want to avoid North Dakota. 
Although shareholders cannot generally make this change happen on 
their own, it is hard to imagine any boards of directors (other than those 
controlled by people like Mr. Icahn) thinking of North Dakota corporate 
governance in anything other than a negative way.  Thus, even if the board 
were inclined to make some concessions to appease shareholders, as it 
stands, incorporating in North Dakota will likely be at the bottom of the list 
of options. 
III. ANSWERING A QUESTION (ALMOST) NO ONE ASKED: 
THE REAL MARKET (OR LACK THEREOF) FOR NEW 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE LAWS 
The options provided in the Act are at least debatably valuable and the 
provisions, conceptually if not specifically, have been the subject of signifi-
cant debate.  But the law, especially in North Dakota, added little to the 
debate other than a framework for discussion because (as explained above) 
all of the “new” provisions in the Act were already available to corpo-
rations, either through amendments to current articles of incorporation or 
through reincorporation (with inclusion of the desired provision in the new 
corporation’s articles of incorporation). 
Numerous reasons have been proffered as to why, and where, corpo-
rations seek to reincorporate.  Many prominent researchers believe that 
there is “state competition” for corporate governance laws71; others believe 
that state competition is a “myth.”72  In either case, the state against which 
all others are compared is Delaware.  There have been countless articles and 
symposia on this subject, and this Article does not purport to survey all the 
relevant literature.  Instead, it seeks to provide a brief overview of some of 
the most relevant corporate-law-as-a-market issues in the debate as they 
apply to the Act. 
One of the leaders in the field of corporate law competition is Roberta 
Romano, Oscar M. Ruebhausen Professor of Law and Director of the Yale 
 
71. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 2, at 214 (explaining that states enact legal reform to keep 
incorporations and that this legal reform puts them in conflict with Delaware). 
72. See, e.g., Kahan & Kamar, supra note 39, at 684-85 (“Other than Delaware, no state has 
engaged in significant efforts to attract incorporations of public companies.”). 
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Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law.  Professor Romano’s 
research has considered the corporate law “as a product,”73 as well as the 
potential value of a federal system of corporate law instead of states com-
peting for corporate business.74  As she recognized more than twenty years 
ago, Delaware is “the most successful state in the market for corporate 
charters.”75 
On the one hand, Professor Romano’s research found that state com-
petition is not inherently harmful to shareholders.76  No studies found that 
investor wealth suffered from state regulation, whether the state changed 
statutes or legal doctrine, or if firms changed their state of incorporation.77  
Further, there was even a positive effect of reincorporation on stock 
prices.78 
However, just because there is no harm, or no immediate harm, to 
shareholders from reincorporation does not mean that corporations should 
(or will) seek to reincorporate in new jurisdictions.  Without understanding 
the reasons for the reincorporation and how specific policies impact 
investor wealth, the reasons behind new corporate governance laws 
becomes a conclusive debate, with stakeholders each reaching self-serving, 
but unsubstantiated results.79  Even with a full understanding of all the rele-
vant issues (a tall order, at best), “the structure of the corporate charter 
market makes it particularly difficult for a state with a relatively small 
volume of incorporations to make inroads against a state with an already 
substantial market share.”80  Thus, the Act faced an uphill battle at the 
outset.  Given that Vermont (and its five public companies) was the initial 
target for the “shareholder friendly” legislation, the promoters of the law 
were primarily interested in passing the law and only secondarily concerned 
with seeing the law actually impact companies.  It seems clear that most of 
those involved understood that the law itself was likely to do little more 
than generate discussion and debate. 
 
73. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, 226 (1985) (attempting “to shed light on the peculiar puzzle that one state, 
Delaware, has consistently been the leading choice for reincorporating firms for over fifty years”). 
74. Roberta Romano, The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOZO L. REV. 
709, 709 (1987) (explaining the debate in the context of whether a federal corporate law system 
was desirable and that the so-called “market competition” for corporate laws was a market “in 
which states compete to provide firms with a product, corporate charters, in order to obtain 
franchise tax revenues”). 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 752. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 757. 
80. See Romano, supra note 73, at 226. 
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Interestingly, Professor Romano recognized the possible concerns that 
could be raised from legislation, like the Act, designed to support large 
investors.81  She noted that institutional investors’ interests could be widely 
divergent from those of individual shareholders.82  Individual investors, she 
explained, are often uninformed and may or may not vote. 
As such, voting rights alone cannot protect all shareholders.83  
Although it may seem as though this possibility might raise concerns about 
management “agenda manipulation,” the real concern, she noted, is “that 
the interest of the majority [of shareholders] is in direct conflict with that of 
the minority.”84 
Professor Romano determined that the primary reason companies 
sought to form or reincorporate in Delaware was “not just the guarantee of 
being located in a state that is responsive to corporate desires but also 
access to a legal system that reduces uncertainty concerning the conse-
quences of actions and hence the transaction costs of doing business.”85  
Some recent commentators have argued that lower transaction costs, and 
not better corporate governance laws, are the primary reason that Delaware 
dominates as the state of choice for incorporating.86 
Others have argued that lower transaction costs are not the only, or 
primary, reason for Delaware’s success, and that the state’s success does 
not necessarily make Delaware law optimal.87  There can be little doubt that 
Delaware’s ability to charge a premium for companies that incorporate in 
the state is an indicator that Delaware has some significant appeal.88  In 
addition to an income tax based on income from business conducted in the 
state,89 Delaware charges a significant franchise tax, which is a charge (per 
issued share) up to a maximum of $165,000.90 
 
81. See Romano, supra note 74, at 755. 
82. See id. 
83. See id. 
84. See id. 
85. See Romano, supra note 73, at 227. 
86. William J. Carney & George B. Shepherd, The Mystery of Delaware Law’s Continuing 
Success, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 5. (arguing that regardless of the mandatory corporate law de-
fault rules, once a company addresses “agency cost and minority protection questions . . . the 
principal feature of an efficient corporate law is a reduction in the transaction costs of organizing 
and operating a business entity”). 
87. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 39, at 684–85. 
88. Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination in the Market for Corporate Law, 
86 CORNELL L. REV. 1205, 1210 (2001) (stating “that there is something special about Delaware 
in the market for incorporations”). 
89. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 30, § 1902 (2009). 
90. Id. tit. 8, § 503(c). 
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It has been argued that “Delaware’s ability to charge a premium for 
incorporation is tied to the three facets of the product that Delaware is 
selling: substantive law, a forum for litigating disputes, and administrative 
services.”91  The first is, at least in part, reduced transaction costs, as noted 
by Romano and others.  With so many companies incorporated under 
Delaware law, and thus so many conflicts occurring under Delaware law, 
the Delaware courts have developed a broad and deep cadre of case law.92  
This, in turn, provides Delaware corporations with a better ability to plan 
transactions and reduce litigation risks than corporations formed under 
other state laws.93  Furthermore, the fact that so many corporations are 
formed in Delaware provides companies with more advisors, legal and 
financial, who are well versed in the risks and rewards of transactions under 
Delaware law.94 
At least with regard to significant portions of corporate law, Delaware 
courts provide an expertise not found anywhere else.95  For example, one 
leading commentator explained how and why Delaware law is so valuable 
with regard to fiduciary duty law, which applies to all corporations, as 
compared to piercing-the-veil cases, which are not especially relevant to 
public corporations96: 
Most American law on fiduciary duty is made in Delaware by a 
group of just ten judges.  Five are on the Court of Chancery, the 
trial court where all corporate cases originate, and five sit on the 
Delaware Supreme Court which hears appeals from the Court of 
 
91. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 1212. 
92. Id.; see also Ficus Investments, Inc. v. Private Capital Mgmt, LLC, 872 N.Y.S.2d 93, 99 
(App. Div. 2009) (“Delaware courts have had ample opportunity to address these issues of 
indemnification for and advancement of expenses and, although not binding as to either Florida or 
New York law, their holdings can be instructive.”); Brandin v. Deason, 841 A.2d 1020, 1024 (Del. 
Ch. 2007) (“Delaware courts have a sizeable interest in resolving . . . novel issues [of law] to 
promote uniformity and clarity in the law that governs a great number of corporations.”). 
93. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 1212. 
94. See id. 
95. Robert B. Thompson, Piercing the Veil: Is the Common Law the Problem?, 37 CONN. L. 
REV. 619, 626 (2005); see also In re Topps Co. Shareholders Litigation, 924 A.2d 951, 958 n. 24 
(Del. Ch. 2007) (“This court’s unique position as the regular arbiter of corporate law disputes, and 
the manner in which this court interacts with the Delaware Supreme Court have played an 
important role in the development of Delaware’s corporate law.”). 
96. See, e.g., Douglas G. Smith, Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries, 2008 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1165, 1887 (2008) (“Many commentators have noted that courts pierce the 
corporate veil more frequently in cases involving closely held corporations as opposed to large, 
publicly owned corporate entities.”).  Although the concept of piercing the veil of corporate 
limited liability is a major part of corporate law, it is hardly a significant part of public 
corporations law. Id.; see also Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and 
Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1, 9 
(1994) (“My study of 1600 piercing-the-veil cases found no case in which shareholders in a public 
corporation were held liable . . .”). 
        
2008] A BRANDING INITIATIVE 1099 
Chancery.  For these chancery court judges their experience, both 
prior to and after becoming judges, gives them an unmatched 
expertise in the field of corporate law.97 
In addition, Delaware courts, and thus Delaware corporations, are 
appealing because they provide a (relatively) quick and specialized forum 
for litigating corporate disputes.98  Delaware’s chancery court is a court 
with limited subject matter jurisdiction that hears primarily corporate mat-
ters.99  As such, Delaware courts have the expertise to handle cases more 
efficiently and effectively than other jurisdictions.100 
Finally, Delaware provides corporations with efficient options and ser-
vices that make incorporation in Delaware simple and feasible, even if all of 
the corporation’s business is conducted in another location.101  Corporations 
are therefore able to avail themselves of Delaware’s corporate laws with 
minimal (if any) inconvenience. 
As noted above, there are those who believe that Delaware is so ad-
vanced in corporate law that there is no such thing as competition for state 
corporate law, or at least, any such competition has been over for some 
time.102  These commentators question the “conventional wisdom” of state 
competition for corporate charters: 
Other than Delaware, states do not gain significant financial 
benefits from competing.  Even if they attracted a substantial num-
ber of public corporations, they would neither earn meaningful 
additional franchises taxes under their current tax structures nor 
profit significantly from an increase in legal business.  Accord-
ingly, they do preciously little to attract incorporations.  Delaware 
aside, states have failed to establish specialized corporate courts, 
 
97. Thompson, supra note 95, at 626. 
98. Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 1212 (“When a corporate dispute arises, the ability to 
resolve the dispute quickly and sensibly is critical.  This is where Delaware really shines.”). 
99. Id.; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 111 (2009) (providing that the Delaware Chancery 
courts have the power, inter alia, “to interpret, apply, enforce or determine the validity of the 
provisions of . . . :  [t]he certificate of incorporation or the bylaws of a corporation”); id. tit. 10, 
§ 341 (“The Court of Chancery shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all matters and 
causes in equity.”). 
100. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 1212 (discussing the reputation of the Delaware 
courts). 
101. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 131, 132 (permitting corporations to have a registered 
agent in the state and allowing for a registered office that “need not be” the same as the 
corporation’s place of business”); State of Delaware, Division of Corporations, About Agency, 
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/aboutagency.shtml (“Our Division of Corporations operates with a 
state-of-the-art efficiency and our staff provides prompt, friendly and professional service to 
clients, attorneys, registered agents and others.”). 
102. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 39, at 685. (“This is not to say that active competition 
for incorporations never existed. . . . [C]ompetition may well have existed in the distant past.”). 
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and have left the design of large portions of their corporate laws to 
judges who lack the knowledge and incentives to attract incorpo-
rations.  And even though states have been quick to adopt anti-
takeover statutes and periodically revise their corporate statutes in 
other respects, they do so largely for reasons unrelated to attracting 
incorporations.  The notion that states compete, and that this com-
petition results in a metaphorical race, is a myth.103 
Regardless of whether there is actually competition for incorporations, 
it seems clear that the Act lacks what would be needed to create any form of 
real market competition beyond a mere novelty.  For one thing, Delaware’s 
significant market power, and resulting revenues, provides the state with 
major incentives to maintain its position.104 
Many states that might wish to compete for some of Delaware’s market 
share in corporate law suffer from “an inconvenient geographic location . . . 
or a negative political reputation—that hamper their ability to attract 
incorporations.”105  Unfortunately, North Dakota at least arguably suffers 
from both of these limitations. 
Geographically, North Dakota is a remote state, at least as compared to 
Delaware.  Bismarck, North Dakota, is 705 miles from Denver, Colorado; 
387 miles from Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; and 835 miles from 
Chicago, Illinois, the closest major cities.  Dover, Delaware, on the other 
hand, is less than 175 miles New York City, Philadelphia, and Washington, 
DC.  In fact, Dover, Delaware, is closer to Chicago (801 miles) than 
Bismarck.  Although the electronic age has made distance significantly less 
important, proximity to the state of incorporation still has its advantages, 
especially with regard to litigation.106 
Second, although largely unfair, North Dakota has been the subject of 
two major news stories that did little to enhance North Dakota’s reputation 
as a good place to do business, thus further harming the prospects of the 
Act.  The first article, The Emptied Prairie107, was a National Geographic 
 
103. Id. at 748. 
104. See id. at 742 (“Delaware has strong incentives to copy useful innovations developed by 
other states.”). 
105. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 88, at 1213 (discussing the significance of factors that 
underlie Delaware’s substantial market power). 
106. This likely explains why the first serious effort to pass William Clark, Jr.’s publicly 
traded corporations act was in Vermont, not North Dakota.  Vermont, while not a short trip from 
most of the major east coast cities, is hundreds of miles closer than Bismarck, and is only about 
180 miles from Boston. 
107. Charles Bowden, The Emptied Prairie, NAT. GEOGRAPHIC, Jan. 2008, at 140-57, 
available at http://ngm.nationalgeographic.com/2008/01/emptied-north-dakota/bowden-text. 
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cover story that garnered attention on major network news.108  Although the 
article was about the dwindling populations of rural North Dakota, the 
sentiment seemed to attach to the entire state: 
That’s the rub in rural North Dakota, a sense of things ebbing, of 
churches being abandoned, schools shutting down, towns becom-
ing ruins.  And all this decline exists amid a seeming statistical 
prosperity:  oil is booming, wheat prices are at record highs, and, 
as the average farm size grows, the land is studded with paper mil-
lionaires living in the lonely sweep of the plains, with surrounding 
community gone to the wind. 
North Dakota is among the windiest states in the Union and one of 
the coldest south of Alaska.  Twice the legislature has considered 
changing the name to simply Dakota to shake the chill from its 
image.  The state’s population has stabilized at around 600,000 
thanks mainly to the growth around its cities—Fargo, Grand 
Forks, Mandan, and Bismarck.  But out on the land, the population 
has relentlessly bled away.  So there is money and prosperity and 
the numbing sense that comes from living in a vanishing world.109 
The article, of course, does not say directly that North Dakota is not a 
good place to do business or that incorporation could not be fruitful in the 
state.  Instead, the article implicitly communicates (or reinforces) that the 
benefits of business in North Dakota have been (and perhaps should be) 
reaped elsewhere.110  After all, the article asserts, “North Dakota has a feral 
edge to it.”111 
Although this sense of the state as a whole was apparently not the 
author’s intent,112 and there were follow-up explanations and clarifications, 
the fact remains that many people, including many North Dakotans, found 
the article damning of the state overall.113  Of course, no one would look at 
 
108. See, e.g., Jonathan Rivoli, ABC Honors North Dakotans, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 23, 
2008, available at http://www.bismarcktribune.com/articles/2008/01/23/news/local/147186.prt 
(discussing the ABC News segment honoring North Dakota as the “Person of the Week”). 
109. Bowden, supra note 107, at 147. 
110. See id. (“In most of the United States, abandoned buildings are a sign of change and 
shifting economic opportunities.  On the High Plains, they always mean that something in the 
earth and the sky mutinied against the settlers.”). 
111. Id. 
112. Chris Rosacker, I Really Like This Place, BISMARCK TRIB., June 10, 2008, at 1A 
(reporting that the author stated in a Bismarck State College appearance, “The comic thing for me 
is, I really like this place”). 
113. Dorreen Yellow Bird, My Heart Belongs to the Great Plains, GRAND FORKS HERALD, 
June 11, 2008, available at http://www.indianz.com/News/2008/009223.asp?print=1 (“[The] 
article almost made me mutiny as a reader of National Geographic.  I see the Plains as a holy 
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the dwindling population of rural Texas as a reason not to do business in the 
major cities, but in a sparsely populated state with no metropolitan area 
with more than 200,000 people,114 first impressions are hard to change. 
The second major news item was a USA Today article about state 
corruption115 following the arrest of Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich.116  
The article, and an accompanying table, asserted that North Dakota was the 
most corrupt state in the nation because it had more public corruption 
convictions on a per-capita basis, based on the newspaper’s “analysis of 
Department of Justice statistics.”117  In North Dakota, the article found, 53 
federal public corruption convictions between 1998 and 2007 meant there 
were 8.3 convictions per 100,000 people, which was the highest number in 
the nation.118  By comparison, Illinois had 3.9 convictions per 100,000, 
making it a mere 18th overall.119 
Although there are significant questions regarding the methodology 
used for the analysis,120 the fact remains that the USA Today headline is 
probably the most recent and significant contact most of America has had in 
the past two years regarding the business climate in North Dakota.  “The 
most corrupt state in America” hardly supports the “branding effort” of the 
Act to establish North Dakota as a place shareholders should seek for their 
corporate governance. 
 
place.  I see the abandoned houses as markers of where we’ve been and the wind as the voice of 
the land.”). 
114. Dennis Cauchon, Big Cities Lure Away North Dakota Youth, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 
2004, at 1A (“The Fargo metropolitan area had 177,064 residents in 2002.”). 
115. John Fritze, North Dakota Tops Analysis of Corruption, USA TODAY, Dec. 11, 2008, at 
5A & tbl. 
116. Jeff Coen et al., Feds Arrest Gov. Blagojevich to Stop . . . A Political “Crime Spree,” 
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2008, at 1 (“The predawn rousting of Gov. Rod Blagojevich from his 
Ravenswood Manor home Tuesday marked a stunning climax to a tale of alleged public 
corruption unmatched in Illinois’ storied history of elected scoundrels and thrust the state into an 
unprecedented political crisis.”).  Blagojevich was eventually unanimously convicted by the state 
Senate on a broad article of impeachment following his arrest on federal corruption charges 
related to allegations he was trying to sell the U.S. Senate seat President Barack Obama left open 
upon taking office.  Rick Pearson & Ray Long, Senate Convicts Blagojevich, Making Him the 1st 
Illinois Governor to be Thrown Out of Office, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 30, 2009, at 1. 
117. Fritze, supra note 115, at 5A. 
118. Id. at 5A tbl.  Louisiana was number two and Alaska was number three.  Id. 
119. Id. This, notwithstanding the comments of Robert Grant, head of the Chicago FBI 
office, “If [Illinois] isn’t the most corrupt state in the United States it’s certainly one hell of a 
competitor.” Id. at 5A. 
120. Brian Duggan, N.D. Says the Only Thing Corrupt Is the Story, BISMARCK TRIB. Dec. 
12, 2008, at 1.  The Washington, D.C.-based “Corporate Crime Reporter’s 2007 report . . . 
newsletter only included the 35 most populated states because of the statistical unfairness on 
sparsely populated states like North Dakota.”  Id.  In 2004, the same newsletter had listed North 
Dakota as public corruption leader, as well, but learned from the “mistake when [they] crunched 
[their] numbers.” Id. 
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IV. FIXING WHAT WASN’T BROKEN: WHAT NORTH DAKOTA 
LAW ALREADY HAD TO OFFER CORPORATIONS AND 
SHAREHOLDERS 
Prior to passing the Act, and certainly after the amendments to Article 
XII of the North Dakota Constitution, North Dakota had many things to 
offer new corporations or those in the market for a new corporate home.  
And, from a shareholder perspective, North Dakota’s corporate laws were 
already significantly more pro-shareholder than those in place in Delaware. 
In Delaware, amendments to the certificate of incorporation121 can only 
be proposed by the board of directors, although shareholders are required to 
approve of the proposed change.122  Under the North Dakota Business 
Corporation Act, “a shareholder or shareholders holding five percent or 
more of the voting power of the shares entitled to vote” may propose 
amendments to the articles of incorporation.123  Although the Act incor-
porates this provision, as well,124 North Dakota offered this pro-shareholder 
provision long before the Act was envisioned. 
For new companies looking to go public or for public companies 
looking for a new home, the North Dakota Business Corporation Act also 
has some favorable provisions that could have been financially appealing.  
Although, as discussed in Part III, the market for corporate governance is 
not clearly defined, and the reasons corporations choose their home state is 
not easily identifiable.  If filing fees were a reason to move, North Dakota, 
under the traditional corporate law, is an appealing state.  Under the North 
Dakota Business Corporation Act, any company’s annual report filing fee is 
$25 (there is no franchise tax based on the number of shares issued).125  
Under Delaware law, the annual report filing fee is also $25; the franchise 
tax ranges from $75 to a maximum of $165,000.126  Under the Act, of 
 
121. The certificate of incorporation in Delaware is the equivalent to the articles of incorpo-
ration in other states, like North Dakota. See ARTHUR  R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, 
UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW § 1.07, at 13 (2d ed. 2004) (explaining that, to form a corpo-
ration, the incorporator(s) must file  “the articles of incorporation (sometimes called a charter or 
certificate of incorporation)”); cf. David W. Barrett, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability 
Standards for Small Charitable Nonprofit Corporations, 71 IND. L.J. 967, 986 n.139 (1996) (“The 
difference between Indiana’s term ‘articles of incorporation’ and Delaware’s term ‘certificate of 
incorporation’ is purely semantic.”). 
122. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b) (2006). 
123. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-19(2) (2007). 
124. Id. § 10-35-15. 
125. Id. § 10-19.1-147(24). 
126. State of Delaware Annual Report & Tax Instructions, http://corp.delaware.gov/ 
paytaxes.shtml. 
        
1104 NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 84:1085 
course, the franchise fee is a maximum of $80,000 (roughly half of 
Delaware’s charge).127 
On a more basic level, North Dakota offers things like “good schools, 
reasonable housing prices (the median home price is under $150,000), short 
commutes, the nation’s lowest crime rate and ample outdoor recreation.”128  
North Dakota also ranks second in academic research and development 
dollars per $1,000 of gross state product, between Maryland and 
Massachusetts, respectively.129 
In the current struggling economy, North Dakota is also one of the few 
states with rising personal incomes, state revenues, and low unemploy-
ment.130  Furthermore, in addition to remaining affordable, the housing 
market remains, at least as compared to the rest of the country, quite 
stable.131  Although North Dakota will likely see its share of the economic 
downturn if the recession continues, the state is well situated as compared 
to most other parts of the country.132 
Given the state of the U.S. economy, North Dakota’s biggest attraction 
is not its shareholder friendly public corporation law option.  Lacking a 
streamlined and efficient (i.e., easy) way for shareholders to compel a 
corporation to relocate to North Dakota, such as a federal law allowing 
shareholders to order such a move, the legislature is likely to attract more 
business to the state by focusing on other initiatives and doing more to 
promote programs already in place.133 
 
127. N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-35-28(3)(b).  There would be additional fees because any corpo-
ration doing business in North Dakota must have a registered agent in the state, but this can be 
accomplished for significantly less than $80,000 per year.  See id. § 10-19.1-15. 
128. Joel Kotkin, The Great Plains, WALL ST. J., Aug. 31, 2006, at A8. 
129. Id. 
130. Conor Dougherty & Ben Casselman, For Energy-Producing States, Prices Yield a 
Boom, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2008, at A4. 
131. See, e.g., Crystal R. Reid, Recession Obsession: Will North Dakota Weather the Shaky 
U.S. Economy?, BISMARCK TRIB., Feb. 27, 2008, at 1A (“Home sales across the nation remain 
sluggish; bankruptcies in 2007 surged in some states, but remained stable in others. In North 
Dakota, the bankruptcies went down and home prices continue to increase.”); Laura McCandlish, 
Maryland Home Sales Tumble Nearly 30%, BALT. SUN, Nov. 22, 2007, at A11 (“Only three 
states—Nevada, Florida and Arizona—had greater slumps in home sales than Maryland.  That 
only two states, North Dakota and Vermont, posted increases emphasizes the severity of the 
housing market slowdown, industry experts said.”). 
132. Crystal R. Reid, Economic Outlook for a Year, BISMARCK TRIB., Jan. 18, 2009, at 1B 
(“Sub-prime mortgages were relatively scarce in North Dakota and banks were prudent in their 
lending practices, so there’s still a level of stability in the state’s markets. . . .  But that’s not to say 
that outside factors aren’t weighing in, of course.”). 
133. See infra Part V. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Act is probably not the most effective piece of legislation to create 
a “brand” that encourages companies to relocate to the state.134  Even if the 
corporate governance landscape has evolved to the point that there is an 
opening for a significant competitor to Delaware, North Dakota is probably 
not going to be that state.  At best, the Act provides a novelty for share-
holder and institutional-investor advocates to use as a leverage point with 
management, and thus—on its own—provides very little long-term upside 
for the state. 
If the state, using the Act, really is seeking to brand North Dakota as a 
good place for incorporations, and capitalize on the efforts already put forth 
with regard to the Act, the first task should be to embrace Carl Ichan’s 
proposal that Congress pass a federal law allowing a majority of share-
holders to force their corporation to reincorporate in the state of their choos-
ing.135  Of course, given the opt-in nature of the Act, the federal law would 
also need to permit the shareholders to specify the actual corporate law 
(even within a state) of their choosing.136 
Such a federal law would likely lead to at least a few incorporations in 
North Dakota, given that some significant shareholder advocates are already 
promoting the option.137  Of course, this presumes that the shareholder ad-
vocates are serious about reincorporating in North Dakota, which they may 
very well be.  However, as it is now, the shareholder proposal to reincorpo-
rate can be made without any serious expectation of the proposal coming to 
fruition.138  If the federal law were to pass, one would expect some other 
opportunistic state (including perhaps Delaware) to follow North Dakota’s 
lead, providing a similar shareholder friendly opt-in public corporations 
law.139 
Any benefit to North Dakota would thus, again, likely be short lived, 
but at least in this scenario some revenues would come to North Dakota as 
the initial state with this type of law.  Although it is hard to predict, such a 
federal law appears unlikely.140  However, political climates change, and if 
 
134 As a former public relations executive, the author supports and encourages a focused 
branding initiative and believes there is a real opportunity to promote North Dakota business, but 
any such campaign needs to be coordinated and cohesive. 
135. See Icahn, supra note 41, at A11. 
136. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(6), 10-35-03 (2007). 
137. See Tuna, supra note 8, at B6; Qwest Letter, supra note 62, at 2; AIG Letter, supra note 
62, at 2. 
138. See Tuna, supra note 8, at B6. 
139. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 39, at 742. 
140. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contractarian 
Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 902 n.228 (1997) 
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a federal shareholder-state-of-choice law were to pass, North Dakota would 
be well situated, at least initially. 
Second, if North Dakota really wants to create a brand as a legal inno-
vator, the state should consider taking the lead in areas of deep resources.  
For example, as a leader in wind energy, North Dakota has the potential to 
provide renewable energy for more than 50% of the country.141  Already, 
North Dakota provides a significant amount of energy to Minnesota, which 
has a renewable portfolios standard (RPS), requiring as much as 30% of 
electricity come from renewable resources by 2020.142 
As a coal-rich state,143 North Dakota has understandably resisted 
legislation that might limit the ability to use one its major resources.  Rather 
than pursuing an RPS, as twenty-eight other states have,144 North Dakota 
instead passed a non-binding renewable energy goal.145  However, one way 
or another, the coal industry is likely to see some restrictions soon, either 
via a federal carbon tax or, more likely, a federal cap-and-trade program.146 
Instead of waiting for a federal program to be imposed on the state (or 
hoping it will never come), North Dakota could take the lead on renewable 
energy legislation by passing a mandatory sustainable electricity standard 
(SES).  Like an RPS, the SES would require a specified percentage of 
electricity sold in the state come from sustainable resources.147  However, 
 
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell, ed., 1995) (“[Sixty]-plus 
years of experience with the dual federal-state regulatory scheme has taught us two things: (1) 
Congress is exceedingly unlikely to adopt a federal law of corporations of any sort, communi-
tarian or otherwise; and (2) this is a very good thing as a matter of both economic efficiency and 
federalism.”)). 
141. See RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, http://www.dsireusa.org/documents/ 
summarymaps/RPS_Map.ppt (providing a map of the state RPS program as of February 2009).  
Twenty-eight states have an RPS, and another five have a renewable energy goal.  Id. 
142. MINN. STAT. § 216B.1691 (2007) (requiring 30% from renewable resources for a 
company that owns a nuclear facility, such as Xcel Energy, and 25% for all other utilities). 
143. See Energy Policy: Pumped up, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2009, at 68 (“Long drag-lines 
scrape the state’s surface, revealing lignite, or brown coal; 91% of North Dakota’s electricity 
comes from coal-fired plants”). 
144. RENEWABLES PORTFOLIO STANDARDS, supra note 141. 
145. N.D. CENT. CODE § 49-02-28 (2007). 
146. See Tom Fowler, Q&A/Markey agrees with Pickens, HOUS. CHRON., Feb.10, 2009, at 4 
(“I think it’s much more likely that a cap-and-trade system [instead of a carbon tax] will be 
used.”) (quoting Rep. Edward Markey, chairman of the Commerce and Energy Subcommittee on 
Energy and the Environment).  On May 21, 2009, a House committee approved the American 
Clean Energy and Security Act, which was sponsored by Representatives Henry Waxman and 
Edward Markey.  If approved, the bill would create the first U.S. cap-and-trade system (at the 
federal level) for reducing greenhouse-gas emissions. Id. The bill also includes a renewable 
electricity standard that would require covered electric utilities to improve energy efficiency and 
procure 15% of their power from renewable sources by 2020.  Id. 
147. See Joshua P. Fershee, Changing Resources, Changing Market: The Impact of a 
National Renewable Portfolio Standard on the U.S. Energy Industry, 29 ENERGY L.J. 49, 64 
(2008).  In an RPS, and the proposed SES, all covered electricity retailers would be required to 
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unlike a traditional RPS, the SES could include clean coal technology.148  
The state legislature would determine what qualifies as “clean coal” (and 
everything else that is “sustainable” under the SES), and that definition 
could play a role in future discussions on the federal level.149 
This is not legislation that would make environmentalists happy, be-
cause most environmental advocates are anti-coal, regardless of the method 
used to generate electricity.150  The legislation would not likely please many 
members of the coal industry, either, because they often argue that such 
regulations are simply too expensive.151  However, the SES would thrust 
North Dakota into the midst of an important debate, a debate in which the 
state has a deep and significant interest.  By promoting wind energy, the 
state would help support wind manufacturing businesses in North Dakota.  
By including coal in the SES, or at least some forms of clean or “cleaner” 
coal, North Dakota would also help ensure a market for the state’s coal, and 
perhaps help steer the national debate toward more opportunities for 
advanced coal technologies.152 
 
hold renewable energy credits (RECs) in the specified proportion (e.g., 10%) to the amount of 
retail energy they sold.  Id. 
148. See Sara Parker, U.S. Senate Says No to “Clean Coal” & Nuclear in RPS, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, June 15, 2007, available at http://www.renewableenergy-
world.com/rea/news/article/2007/06/u-s-senate-says-no-to-clean-coal-nuclear-in-rps-48960 
(reporting that a proposed national RPS, “which included clean coal technology and nuclear 
power alongside traditional sources of renewable energy, was voted down in the U.S. Senate this 
afternoon 56-29”). 
149. See Fershee, supra note 147, at 64 (noting that clean coal technologies could be 
included in an RPS and that “what constitutes ‘clean’ is never an easy answer”). 
150. See, e.g., Ken Ward Jr., Governor’s Energy Plan Gets Mixed Reviews, CHARLESTON 
GAZETTE (W. Va.), Feb. 12, 2009, available at http://wvgazette.com/News/200902110992 (“We 
would not support [an RPS with] so-called ‘clean coal’ . . . .  Coal cannot be clean because of 
what happens when it’s mined and because of the waste that is created when it’s burned.” (quoting 
Vickie Wolfe, “who follows energy issues for the West Virginia Environmental Council”)); Sara 
Parker, National RPS to Include Coal & Nuclear?, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM, June 13, 
2007, available at http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/print/article/2007/06/ 
national-rps-to-include-coal-nuclear-48921 (“There is no reason to dilute the bill [by adding clean 
coal and nuclear].  [Renewable sources] are ready for market now.  They’re cost competitive now 
and they don’t require continuing operating and construction subsidies.” (quoting Jim Rubens, 
Union of Concerned Scientists)). 
151. Mark Clayton, In Big U.S. Energy Bill, Who Will Pay?, CHRISTIAN SCI. MON., Nov. 7, 
2007, at 1 (“[I]ndustry groups—oil, coal, auto, and electric utilities—worry that they will have to 
foot most of the cost of any new energy legislation, which could run up to $32 billion.”); see also 
Stephen Foley, US Coal Lobbyists Unveil Nightmarish Vision of Life After Cap-and-Trade Law, 
INDEPENDENT (U.K.), June 3, 2008, at 34 (reporting the coal industry’s “predictions of dire 
consequences if carbon emissions were capped”). 
152. North Dakota would not be the first state to do so, however.  Michigan, for instance, 
recently passed an RPS that allows coal-fired plants that capture (and store) 85% of carbon 
dioxide emissions to satisfy the requirements.  2008 Mich. Pub. Acts page no.143, § 3(c)(3) 
(enrolled S. Bill 213).  Similarly, Massachusetts recently added clean coal to its RPS. Lisa Wood, 
Mass. Utilities Now Must Include Clean Coal, Other Alternatives in Portfolios, ELEC. UTIL. 
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Finally, beyond any one or two specific laws, if North Dakota is seek-
ing a “brand image” at all, the state’s leaders need to determine first what it 
is that is being branded.  Is it corporate governance?  Business generally?  
The people and resources?  Only after the product or products are deter-
mined can an effective branding campaign can take shape. 
Although the Act was not a part of a focused and concerted branding 
effort for North Dakota, or apparently even a significant ideological com-
mitment to increasing shareholder rights,153 the state could stand to reap 
some benefits of offering the first-of-its-kind statute.  To do so, however, 
the state must embrace its position.  If the Act is to be taken seriously, 
North Dakota should: (1) embrace the federal shareholder choice legisla-
tion, (2) promote the Act with a coordinated pubic relations and/or adver-
tising campaign to raise awareness of the state’s innovative approach, and 
(3) pass and promote other innovative legislation that makes clear North 
Dakota is a forward-looking, forward-thinking state as far as businesses are 
concerned. 154 
If the Act is a singular, isolated piece of legislation that is quietly avail-
able for anyone who wants it, it is simply some small state law written by 
large investors (and their advocates) to irritate large companies.155  But, by 
embracing the Act and the potentially innovative corporate governance it 
represents, North Dakota has an opportunity to change, or at least modify, 
some perceptions about business in the high plains.  To do so, would 
require some effort. 
New ways of thinking about a state—new brand images—are not 
created by going along to get along.  There is always risk in seeking a new 
image, but that risk comes with the potential for the big payoff.  North 
Dakota took the first step to get recognized as a new player in corporate 
governance by passing the Act.  If the first step is also the last step, it will 
be an opportunity lost. 
 
WEEK, Jan. 12, 2009, at 23.  Nonetheless, as a leader in both wind and coal energy, North Dakota 
could, and should, take a significant role in the discussion. 
153. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 10-35-02(6), 10-35-03 (2007) (making clear that the Act is 
optional and thus not extending any of the Act’s shareholder protections to current shareholders). 
154. The state already has a good start on this front.  The University of North Dakota’s Col-
lege of Business and Public Administration is ranked number 13 among U.S. undergraduate 
schools for entrepreneurship. Press Release, Entrepreneur Media Inc. & The Princeton Review, 
UND College of Business and Public Administration Ranks #13 in Nation for Entrepreneurship 
(Sept. 8, 2009), available at http://www.business.und.edu/entr/Top%20Colleges%202008%20 
Template%20Release_final%20%20_3_ pdf. 
155. See Tuna, supra note 8, at B6 (“‘This is more a wake-up call for Delaware to modernize 
than any significant attempt to attract business in North Dakota,’ says Richard Ferlauto, head of 
corporate governance and pension investment at the American Federation of State, County and 
Municipal Employees.”). 
